2022 PRE-DAY REVIEWER WITH CASES PENNED BY J. CAQUIOA BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
1. If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity punishable under RA No. 9262 is committed in Singapore but the psychological effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife of the respondent, who suffered mental anguish, is residing in the Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction (see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. no. 212448, January 11, 2018). 2. Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over crime committed on board A foreign merchant ship passing through the 12-mile territorial sea in the following cases: (1) if its 1|Page
consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 3. Under Article 14 of the Civil Code, penal laws shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory. This is the generality principle. Hence, a person regardless of his citizenship, religion, political position or any other status can be criminally prosecuted and convicted as long as he is living or sojourning in the territory of the Philippines. 4. Case law or jurisprudence recognizes presidential immunity. Because of this immunity, penal laws are not obligatory to the President. The President of the Philippines is entitled to immunity from suit subject to the following conditions: (1) the immunity has been asserted; (2) during the period of his incumbency and tenure; and (3) the act constituting the crime is committed in the performance of his duties. Presidential immunity will assure the exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief Executive is a job that demands undivided attention. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001) There is no vicepresidential immunity since he is not the Chief Executive, whose job damands undivided attention. 5. If the offense punishable under special law is inherently evil, there are two views on the standard in classifying a crime as malum in se or malum prohibitum. First view - The first view is that if the offense is punishable under a special law, it will be treated as malum prohibitum. Thus, fencing (Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020), hazing (Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020) and trafficking in person (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 238754, June 16, 2021) are mala prohibita since they are punishable under special criminal laws. Second view - The second view is that although the offense is punishable under special law, if the same is inherently evil it will be treated as malum in se. Child p*rnography (Cadajas vs. People, G.R. No. 247348, June 15, 2022), plunder (Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017) and violence against women (Acharon vs. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021) are mala in se although they are punishable under special laws since they are inherently wrong. Sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is considered by the Supreme Court as malum prohibitum simply because it is punishable under a special law. In sum, the first view was applied in this case. (Carbonell vs. People, G.R. No. 246702, April 28, 2021) Child abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610 is considered by the Supreme Court as malum in se because is it inherently wrong (Demata vs. People, G.R. No. 228583, September 15, 2021) In sum, the second view was applied in this case. 6. If the crimes committed against the target victim and third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, were produced by a single act, the accused is liable for a complex crime. Thus, a single act of throwing a grenade or firing a gun killing one and injuring another constitutes a complex crime of murder with attempted murder. (People v. Julio Guillen, G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950; People vs. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020) However, the accused is liable for separate crimes despite the application of the aberratio ictus rule, and not a complex crime in the following cases: (a) If the bullet that killed the target victim is different from the bullet that killed the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, Justice Caquioa); (b) If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, is merely a light felony such as slight 2|Page
physical injuries (People v. Violin, G.R. Nos. 114003-06, January 14, 1997); (c) If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, is child abuse, which is an offense punishable under special law (Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) Components of complex crime must be felonies. Accused consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC, consequently injuring AAA (3 years old) and BBB (2 months old) burning their skins and faces. Accused is liable for child abuse involving infliction of physical injury although there is no intent to degrade, debase or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. In fact, the intention of the accused is merely to inflict injury on CCC but because of aberratio ictus or mistake of blow, AAA and BBB were also injured. In sum, because of Article 4 of RPC, accused is liable for the wrongful act done (child abuse against AAA and BBB) although it differs from the wrongful act intended (physical injuries on CCC). This is not a complex crime. Accused is convicted of two counts of child abuse. (See: Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) He should also be held liable for physical injuries. 7. Stabbing a person without knowing that he is already dead is an impossible crime. (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992) However, if the accused, who stabbed the dead body of the victim, conspired with the one who previously hacked and killed the victim, the former is liable for murder and not an impossible crime because of the collective responsibility rule. The liability of the accused for murder is not based on his act of stabbing the dead body of the victim. His liability is based on the act of his co-conspirator in hacking and killing the victim, which by the fiction of the law shall be treated as the act of both of them. (People v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018, Caguioa) 8. Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose mental age is 2 years old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose mental age is 12 years old and (d) borderline intelligence. (People vs. Gilles, G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018) Having sexual intercourse with the offended party, who is under 16 years of age, is statutory rape. The word “age” in this provision includes chronological age and mental age. Hence, having sexual intercourse with idiot with the mental age of 2 years, imbecile with a mental age of 7 years, or feebleminded or moron with the mental age of 12 years, or a person with borderline intelligence with a mental age of under 16 is statutory rape (People vs. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017). The term, "deprived of reason," is associated with insanity or madness. The term "demented," refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called dementia. A mentally retarded person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. In fact, a mentally retarded persons can be credible witnesses. However, he is immature, and socially irresponsible and dependent (People vs. Daniega, supra; People vs. Niebres, G.R. No. 230975, December 04, 2017) Thus, an offender, who committed sexual intercourse with a mentally retarded person, must be prosecuted for statutory rape of a person under 16 years of mental age, and not rape against a person deprived of reason or demented person. (People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 242684, February 17, 2021, Justice Caquioa) Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610 as amended by RA No. 10648, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and acts of lasciviousness under RPC. The word “age” in the phrase “when the victim is under sixteen (16) years of age” in Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is either chronological or mental. (People vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016) 3|Page
In exempting circ*mstance of imbecility, what is important is the mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is 2 years, and an imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011, Bersamin) are exempt from criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose mental age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal liability since he is not an imbecile (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is entitled to mitigating circ*mstance of mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L3246, November 29, 1950). In exempting circ*mstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is the chronological or actual age of the accused. If the actual age of the accused is 18 years old and mental age is 9 years old, the exempting circ*mstance of minority and imbecility shall not be appreciated because he is neither a minor nor an imbecile (People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014). 9. Section 5 of PD 1612 states that mere possession of any object which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. However, this presumption was overcome by the accused upon presentation of the notarized affidavits of the President and Chief Mechanic of Bicycle Works that indeed, he bought the bicycle subject of the case from their store. Without proof that the bicycle stolen from the complainant is the same bicycle in the possession of the accused, the presumption under Section 5 of PD 1612 would not operate. (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 249196, April 28, 2021) Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is committed if the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken into consideration the attending circ*mstances such as (1) the price of the property is so cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in a street; (3) accused knew that the car he bought was not properly documented (Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new tires are being peddled in the streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra). Furthermore, mere possession of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6 of PD No. 1612). In sum, possession of stolen property gives rise to the presumption that the possessor “knows or should have known” that the property is stolen. The accused should have been forewarned that the soft drinks came from an illegal source, as his transaction with the thief did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft drinks. He should have known that the goods are stolen. He was convicted of fencing. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018) There is a second crime of fencing, and that is, selling or buying secondhand goods without a permit. In Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016, the clearance stated in Section 6 of PD No. 1612 is only required if several conditions, are met: first, that the person is in the business of buying and selling of anything of value; second, that such thing of value was obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof; and third, that such thing of value is to be offered for sale to the public. In the present case, the first and third requisites were not met. Nowhere was it established that accused was engaged in the business of buy and sell. Neither was the prosecution able to establish that accused intended to sell or was actually selling the subject grader to the public. The accused bought the property for his personal use. 10. If the offender dragged victim to place where there are no other persons to witness the incident, the dragging which may constitute forcible abduction will be considered as part of the commission of rape. Hence, doctrine of absorption applies. Since forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape; hence, the latter absorbs the former. (People v. Almanzor, G.R. No. 4|Page
124916, July 11, 2002) However, if the victim was brought to a house or motel or a place at a considerable distance from the place where she was abducted, forcible abduction will be considered a necessary means to commit rape; hence, the acts constitute a complex crime proper. (People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971) If the offender abducted the victim, touched her private parts, transported her to hotel and raped her four times. Touching her private parts immediately after the abduction is evidence of lewd design. Abduction with lewd design is forcible abduction. Since forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit the first rape, the two will be merged together to form a complex crime. The second, third and fourth rape shall be treated as separate crimes. (People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971) If the offender abducted the victim, transported her to a house and raped her four times. There is no showing that at the time of the abduction, the offender is motivated by lewd design. Hence, the crime committed is kidnapping and not forcible abduction. Since the victim was rape in the course of detention, this is a special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. Regardless of the number of rapes, this is a single indivisible crime of kidnapping with rapes. (People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011) 11. A, B, C and D abducted X and her maids, Y and Z, in Quezon City and brought them in a safehouse in Tagaytay. A raped X, B raped Y and C raped Z. D demanded ransom from the parents of X. For failure to give the ransom, D killed X, Y and Z. It is a basic rule that there are as many criminal impulses to deprive liberty as there are persons whose liberties has been deprived of. Hence, the kidnappers are liable for as many kidnappings and serious illegal detention as there are persons detained. (People v. Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 and 138991, June 18, 2003) Since there are three victims in this case, A, B, C and D are liable for two counts of kidnapping for ransom. Since X, Y and Z were killed in the course their detention, three counts of special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide are committed. The rapes committed by A, B and C against X, Y and Z shall be integrated into the two special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide, respectively. (People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004) A, B, C and D entered the house of X and took her money and jewelries. They also took the money of Y and Z, the maids of X. Then, A raped X, B raped Y and C raped Z. Later on, D killed X, Y and Z. Since there is a single criminal impulse to rob the house of X, they committed a single crime of robbery although there are three victims. Taking money from Y and Z is only a consequence of their original and single impulse to commit robbery in the house of X, and therefore cannot be taken as separate and distinct offenses. The crime of robbery is a continuing crime (delito continuado), thus, although there is a series of acts, there is but one crime committed. (People vs. Coritana, G.R. No. 209584, March 03, 2021) Since by reason or on occasion of robbery, X, Y and Z were killed, they are liable for a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In this special complex crime, it is immaterial that several persons are killed. It is also immaterial that aside from the homicides, rapes are committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, rapes committed against X, Y and Z in the course of robbery shall be integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. (People vs. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26, 2020) 12. In robbery with homicide, the victim of the robbery need not be the victim of the homicide, (People vs. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26, 2020) and it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a bystander (People vs. Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding policeman (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the robbers. (People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020) 5|Page
13. Case law establishes that whenever homicide or rape has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide or rape although they did not take part in the homicide or rape, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing or rape. (People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020; People vs. Coritana, G.R. No. 209584, March 03, 2021) However, in fine, the long line of jurisprudence on the special complex crime of robbery with rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act in order for him to have the opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, without which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. (People vs. Agaton, G.R. No. 251631, August 27, 2020) If there is no evidence that the accused is aware of the commission of rape, he could not have prevented the rape. Hence, the accused is only liable for robbery and not robbery with rape. (People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490, June 22, 1995) Canturia principle where lack of awareness is a defense is applicable to kidnapping with rape (People v. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011), kidnapping with homicide, robbery with homicide (People v. Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997) and robbery with arson. Canturia principle is not applicable to robbery with homicide. Even though the accused was not aware of the killing by his co-robber and had no the opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, he is still liable for special complex crime of robbery with homicide since the killing of the victim is an inherent consequence of the violence which is an element of robbery. 14. At the time Congress was crafting the provision on robbery with rape, its members were thinking of rape under Article 335 of RPC, which is committed through sexual intercourse. There is no crime of sexual assault in 1993 when its members were making the special complex crime of robbery with rape a heinous crime. Hence, the crime of sexual assault is not within the contemplation of the word “rape” as a component special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article 294. If by reason or on occasion of robbery, sexual assault is committed, the offender is liable for separate crimes of robbery and sexual assault. (See: People vs. Barrera, G.R. No. 230549, December 01, 2020) 15. If the victim dies or is killed as a consequence of detention, the offender is liable for special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide. If the victim dies or is killed in the course of arbitrary detention, the offender is not liable for special complex crime. Neither is he liable for complex crime. These two crimes were not produced by a single act. Arbitrary detention was not used as a necessary means to commit murder. Hence, the offenders are liable for separate crimes of murder and arbitrary detention even if they were indicted of a complex crime in the Information. It was improper for the prosecutor to have charged them of a complex crime as the offenses were separate and distinct from each other and cannot be complexed. (People vs. Dongail, G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020) 16. If the robbers held hostages the victims to prevent the policemen form arresting them, the crime committed is robbery, which absorbs illegal detention. Since the principal intention of the accused is to rob the victims, and the deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the responding police officers from arresting them, the crime committed is robbery, which absorbed incidental kidnapping and serious illegal detention. (People v. Astor, G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, April 29, 1987) If the rapist held hostage the victim to prevent the policemen from arresting him, the crimes committed are rape and serious illegal detention. Since 6|Page
the detention continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape. Hence, the crimes shall be considered as separate. (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018) 17. Article 64 (5) on special mitigating circ*mstance that requires the graduation of penalty is only applicable if the penalty contains three periods. Reclusion perpetua to death prescribed for parricide is not a penalty containing three periods. The applicable provision is Article 63 par. 2 (3) on the rule involving a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. Hence, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Reclusion perpetua is lesser than death. Hence, the accused shall be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. (People vs. Padilla, G.R. No. 247603, May 05, 2021) 18. In 2019 the DOJ issued new implementing rules of RA No. 10592 under which detention prisoner charged with heinous crime or convicted prisoner, who is convicted of heinous crimes, are not entitled to GCTA, special time allowance for loyalty, and time allowance for study, teaching, and mentoring under Articles 97 and 98 of the Codes. The Supreme Court in Miguel vs. Director of Bureau Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021, recognizes the validity of the DOJ implementing rules (2019 Revised IRR). It was held that the GCTA Law and 2019 Revised IRR have made abundantly clear that persons charged with and/or convicted of heinous crimes are not entitled to the benefits under the law. 19. Within 15 days from promulgation of judgement of conviction, the accused had the following remedies: (a) If the penalty imposed exceeds six (6) years of imprisonments, the accused can file an appeal or motion for reconsideration. (b) If the penalty imposed exceeds six (6) months of imprisonment but not exceeding 6 years, the accused can file an appeal or apply for probation. (c) If the penalty imposed arresto menor or arrestor mayor (not exceeding 6 months), the accused can file an appeal, or apply for probation or community service. These remedies of appeal, probation and community service are mutually exclusive. In sum, filing an appeal will exclude applying for probation or community service as a remedy; applying for probation will exclude filing an appeal or applying for community service as a remedy; and applying for community service will exclude filing an appeal or application for probation as a remedy. However, under A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, in the event that the court denies the application for community service and the period to appeal has not yet lapsed, the accused may still choose to appeal or apply for probation. Moreover, the accused can withdraw the application for probation and file an appeal provided that both the withdrawal and appeal are made within the period of perfecting an appeal. (Yusi v. Morales, G.R. No. 61958, April 28, 1983; The accused was convicted of malversation and sentenced to suffer a penalty of 11 years of prision mayor, which is non-probationable. The judgment becomes final prior to the effectivity of RA No. 10951, which generally reduced the penalty for malversation. Despite the immutability of a final judgment, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty to 3 years of prision correccional in accordance with RA No. 10951, which penalty is now probationable. Since the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, she is now allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. (Hernan vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017; Aguinaldo vs. People, G.R. No. 226615, January 13, 2021) The accused can apply that the penalty be served by rendering community service. If the accused is sentenced with a penalty higher than arresto menor or 7|Page
arresto mayor, and on appeal the penalty was lowered to arresto menor or arresto mayor, which became final and executory, the accused may, upon written application with the court of origin, seek community service in lieu of imprisonment (A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, October 6, 2020) Under PD No. 968, The benefits of probation law shall not be extended to those who have been once on probation. Under Article 88-A of RPC, the privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall availed of only once. Under A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, October 6, 2020, an accused who has applied and was granted probation in a previous case is not disqualified to apply for community service in a subsequent case. Under PD No. 968, the benefits of probation law shall not be extended to those who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six months and one day. Availing community service in a previous case means that the penalty imposed in that case is not higher than arresto menor or arrestor mayor. Since the penalty in his previous case does not exceed 6 months, he can apply for probation in his present case. Accused is charged of sale of dangerous drugs. Pursuant to a pleabargaining agreement, he pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of possession of drug paraphernalia, which is punishable 6 months and 1 day to 4 years. Sale of dangerous drugs is not probationable. However, in applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of. In sum, in determining the eligibility of the accused for probation, the court shall consider possession of drug paraphernalia for which he pleaded guilty, and not sale of dangerous drugs with which he is charged. Possession of drug paraphernalia is probationable since the penalty prescribed for it does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment. Under Section 24 of RA No. 9165, any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. However, possession of drug paraphernalia is not considered as drug trafficking or pushing. Hence, the accused is eligible to apply for probation. (Pascua vs. People, G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020) 20. Re-election to public office or condonation of a re-elected public officer is not a defense in a criminal case. (Oliveros v. Judge Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974) Under the old rule, the reelection to public office or condonation of a re-elected public officer was a defense in an administrative case. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992) But doctrine of administrative condonation has been abandoned because it is inconsistent with the concept of public office is a public trust (Morales v. CA and Binay, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015) However, the Morales principle shall be given a prospective effect (Ombudsman v. Mayor Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017) The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation took effect on April 12, 2016, when the Supreme Court denied with finality the OMB's Motion for Reconsideration in Morales case. (Crebello v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019) Thus, the re-elected public officer can still use the condonation as a defense subject to two conditions: (1) the administrative complaint is filed before April 12, 2016; and (2) the respondent was re-elected before April 12, 2016. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Malapitan, G.R. No. 229811, April 28, 2021) 21. Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964) Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of contract. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynando, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010; 1984 Bar Exam) Hence, as a general rule, novation is not a defense in a criminal case.
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However, a novation can extinguish the old contract, which may be the basis of criminal liability. In such a case, novation is a defense. In estafa through misappropriation, “receiving the property in trust” is an element thereof. In sum, a contract of trust is an ingredient of this crime. Novation may convert the contract of trust into a loan contract, or create doubt on the original transaction’s true nature. (People v. Nery, supra) In these situations, the accused will be acquitted for failure to prove the element of “receipt of property in trust.” Thus, novation is a defense in estafa through misappropriation where the contract of agency is converted into a sale. (Degaños v. People, G.R. No. 162826, October 14, 2013; 1988 Bar Exam) Moreover, “receiving the property under an obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return” is an element of estafa through misappropriation. Novation may convert a contract where the accused has the duty to return property into a new contract where the accused has no such duty. Hence, estafa through misappropriation is not committed. In Sorongon vs. People, G.R. No. 230669, June 16, 2021, Justice Caquioa, there is no longer any duty or obligation on the part of the accused to deliver or return the cement mixer to the private complainant or to any other person for that matter because the ownership thereof had already been transferred to the accused by the private complainant's waiver and renunciation in his favor. The accused was acquitted of the charge of estafa through misappropriation. Novation can only be used as a defense in a crime where one of its elements is the existence of a contractual relationship between the offender and the victim. Novation is a defense in estafa through misappropriation since the juridical possession of the property by the offender, which is a requisite to this crime, may be based on contract. Novation cannot be used as a defense in case of theft or estafa through false pretense since contract is not an element of this crime. There is nothing to novate. (People v. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, April 29, 1968) (Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, January 25, 2012) Novation may be express or implied. There is express novation when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. There is implied novation when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. Partial payment and promise to pay the balance of obligation under a contract of agency will not convert it into a sale. There is no novation since the obligation of the accused in making a partial payment is not incompatible with the obligation to give the proceeds of the sale of the property under the contract of agency. (Degaños v. People, supra;) In commodatum, ownership of the thing loaned does not pass to the borrower. In the settlement between the private complainant and the accused before the barangay proceedings, the former waived her ownership over the cement mixer in favor of the latter in exchange for the concession that he would refrain from filing any case against her in the future. The obligation of the accused (returning the property) under the old contract of commodatum is not compatible with his obligation (refraining from failing a case) under the amicable settlement. Novation had effectively occurred. Being the owner of the cement mixer, the accused has no obligation to return the same to the private complainant. (Sorongon vs. People, Justice Caquioa) 22. Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day when the crime is committed. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, under which prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party or State through a person in authority or his agent. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the state through person in authority or its agent, and private complainant does not know, or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a crime. In sum, the State and complainant should not be blame for failure to institute the 9|Page
case immediately after the commission of the crime if he is ignorant of such commission. 23. The 10-year prescriptive period for falsification of document shall commence to run on the date of recording of the falsified deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds because of the constructive notice rule under the Torren system. In sum, the complainant constructively discovered the crime on the date of registration. (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018) The 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy shall commence to run on the date of actual discovery of the bigamous marriage and not from the registration of bigamous marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar. The law on Civil Registry and the Family Code, which governed registration of marriage, do not provide a rule on constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994). 24. Under Act 3326, prescription for an offense punishable under special laws begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense, if the date of the commission of the crime is known, or from the date of discovery thereof if it unknown. This is the blameless ignorance doctrine. A municipal mayor, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality gave a company unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference by awarding a contract for the solid waste management program of the municipality without a public bidding and without recommendation by the bids and awards committee and despite the fact that the paid- up capital of the company is only PhP7,000.00. The 20-year prescriptive period begins to run upon the execution of the contract, which is the date of the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Under the Local Government Code, contracts entered by the mayor are required to be posted at a conspicuous place in the municipal hall. Moreover, the documents involving the procurement of the services are available to the public. The transparency regarding the said anomalous transaction provides the State with reasonable means of knowing the existence of the crime. The State is presumed to know that the crime has been committed. (See: Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862. November 3, 2020, Justice Caquioa) If the mayor in conspiracy with other public officers concealed the contract and related documents to the public, the 20-year prescriptive shall commence to run from discovery of the crime by person in authority or his agent. The concealment would make it impossible for the State to discover the anomalies in the contract. If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is not readily available to the public, there is no way for the State to know that the crime has been committed. Under the law, SALNs are accessible to the public for copying or inspection at reasonable hours. Under the circ*mstances, the State is to be presumed to know of her omissions during the eight-year period of prescription set in Act No. 3326. Hence, the general rule applies; prescription begins to run from the date the accused failed to file SALN. (People vs. Parba-Rural, G.R. No. 231884, June 27, 2018) Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies (such as behest loans or transactions involving the construction of nuclear power plant, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986. (Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013) Hence, the prescriptive period for violation of R.A. No. 3019 commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the 10 | P a g e
Committee made an exhaustive investigation. (Presidential Ad hoc Fact-finding Committee v. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011) 25. The filing of complaint involving violation of ordinance with the prosecutor’s office does not interrupt the running of period of prescription. The proceedings mentioned in Act No. 3326 are “judicial proceedings.” Preliminary investigation, which is not a judicial proceeding contemplated in Act 3326, will cause a prescriptive interruption. (Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992) The provision in the Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by institution of criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance because case involving this crime is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. (Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013) The filing of complaint involving violation of BP Blg. 22 with the prosecutor’s office interrupts the running of period of prescription. Under Act No. 3326, the running of the prescription of offense punishable under special law shall be interrupted when “judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment” are instituted against the guilty person. The term “proceedings” should now be understood either as executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. Hence, institution of proceeding, whether executive or judicial, interrupts the running of prescriptive period. (Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012) The Jadewell case is not compatible with Panaguiton case. However, for purpose of the bar exam, the Jadewell principle should be applied if the case involved violation of ordinance. Jadewell should not be applied to offenses under special laws even they are covered by the rules on summary procedure. (People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019) The filing of complaint involving simple oral defamation with the prosecutor’s office interrupts the running of period of prescription. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides “the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.” The filling of compliant for preliminary investigation if the fiscal’s office interrupts the running of prescription of simple slander because Article 91 does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed in the Office of the Prosecutor for preliminary investigation or in court for action on the merits. (Francisco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983) Jadewell case cannot be applied to prescription of felonies although they are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Jadewell is interpreting Act No. 3326, while Francisco is interpreting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The filing of complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 with the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation shall interrupt the running of the 20-year prescriptive period (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862. November 3, 2020, Justice Caquioa) 26. Simple assault (e.g., punching) upon an agent of a person in authority (e.g., police officer) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes simple resistance and not direct assault because there is no intent to defy the law and its representative at all hazard, which is an element thereof (U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918). But serious assault upon agent of a person in authority while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs. Cox, G.R. No. 1406, January 6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910).
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Simple assault (e.g., punching) upon a person in authority (e.g., mayor or chief of police) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes qualified direct assault. The law does not distinguish between serious and simple “laying of hands” upon a person in authority as a qualifying circ*mstance. Hence, a simple laying of hands upon a person in authority constitutes qualified direct assault. The Tabiana principle is only applicable if the victim is an agent of a person in authority (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, November 9, 1918). If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of duties at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is immaterial. Direct assault is committed even if the motive (such as non-payment of loan) was totally foreign to victim’s official function (Sarcepuedes vs. People, G.R. No. L3857, October 22, 1951). If the person in authority or his agent is not engaged in the actual performance of duties at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is material. To constitute direct assault, the offender must have assaulted the victim by reason of his past performance of duty as a person in authority or as an agent. (People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974) Assaulting a mayor while performing his duty in city hall by reason of nonpayment of loan is direct assault. Assaulting a mayor on vacation by reason of approving an ordinance is direct assault. Assaulting a mayor on vacation by reason of non-payment of loan is physical injuries with aggravating circ*mstance of disregard of rank. Attacking a judge on the street by reason of past performance of duty (such as citing the accused in contempt) constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. vs. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16, 1911). But attacking a retired judge by reason of past performance of duty is not direct assault since he is not a person in authority at the time of the assault. Note: The mandatory retirement age of a judge is 70 years. Attacking a third person (student) who comes to the aid of a person in authority (teacher), who is a victim of direct assault (slapped by another student), is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority (police officer), who is a victim of direct assault (seriously assaulted), is liable for indirect direct assault. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority (police officer), who is a victim of simple resistance (punched once), is liable for physical injuries. Single act of stabbing the mayor while in the performance of his duty or by reason of past performance of duty constitute complex crime of direct assault and homicide. (People vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 247961, June 16, 2021) There is also a complex crime of direct assault with attempted homicide or less serious physical injuries. However, single act of punching the mayor while in the performance of his duty or by reason of past performance of duty constitutes direct assault and slight physical injuries. Under Article 48 of RPC, single act constituting a two or more grave or less grave felony is a complex crime. Hence, this is not a complex crime since slight physical injuries is a light felony. Direct assault will absorb slight physical injuries since the latter is inherent in the former. 27. Serious physical injuries contemplate physical deformity or the loss of a body part resulting in the alteration of one's physical appearance. The loss of a tooth, may, in most cases, be later repaired or replaced with an artificial tooth by a competent dentist. Thus, for the loss of a tooth to be considered within the scope of serious physical injuries, the circ*mstances surrounding its loss and whether it caused a physical deformity or permanent alteration of one's physical appearance must be examined on a case-to-case basis. (Ruego vs. People, G.R. No. 226745, May 03, 2021) There may be cases where the loss of teeth would 12 | P a g e
cause a physical deformity that can no longer be remedied by science. Hence, the crime committed is serious physical injuries. (Ruego vs. People, supra) During the trial, the complainant was asked to show to the trial court his tooth, to which the trial court noted that it was already an artificial tooth. The complainant’s face had no visible disfigurement that would warrant accused’s conviction of serious physical injuries. He was convicted of slight physical injuries. (Ruego vs. People, supra) 28. There are two kinds of rape: (1) rape through sexual intercourse; and (2) rape through sexual assault. However, the Supreme Court in People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019 said that rape through sexual intercourse should be called as “rape” while rape through sexual assault should be called “sexual assault.” There are three kinds of sexual assault, to wit: (1) instrument or object sexual assault, which is committed by inserting an instrument or object (e.g., finger or tongue) into the genital or anal orifice of another person; (2) sexual assault through oral intercourse, which is committed by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth; and (3) sexual assault through sodomy, which is committed by inserting his penis into another person’s anal orifice. In sexual assault, the gender of the offender and the victim is not material. If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002). But the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape and sexual assault. Inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes separate crimes of sexual assault and rape (People vs. Dereco, G.R. No. 243625, December 2, 2020) Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of RPC uses the term “man” in defining rape without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim. Under Article 266-C of RPC, in case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed (People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014). If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule. Acts of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of rape. If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not applicable since sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge of rape. The elements of these two crimes are materially and substantially different. (People vs. Dereco, G.R. No. 243625, December 02, 2020) In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017); or acts of lasciviousness under RPC in relation to RA No. 7610 (People vs. Dagsa, G.R. No. 219889, January 29, 2018); or lascivious conduct under RA No. 7610 (People vs. ZZZ, G.R. No. 224584, September 04, 2019). Acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct is necessarily included in the charge of rape. If the crime charged is acts of lasciviousness, but the crime proven is sexual assault, he will be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Sexual assault is a crime undoubtedly greater than acts of lasciviousness. While it is true that the crime of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in the crime of sexual assault, the crime of sexual assault however is not subsumed in the crime of acts of lasciviousness. (People vs. Jagdon, Jr., G.R. No. 242882, September 09, 2020) 13 | P a g e
29. Failure to judicially charge within the prescribed period renders the public officer effecting the arrest liable for the crime of delay in the delivery of detained persons under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. If the warrantless arrest was without any legal ground, the arresting officers become liable for arbitrary detention under Article 124. However, if the arresting officers are not among those whose official duty gives them the authority to arrest, they become liable for illegal detention under Article 267 or 268. If the arrest is for the purpose of delivering the person arrested to the proper authorities, but it is done without any reasonable ground or any of the circ*mstances for a valid warrantless arrest, the arresting persons become liable for unlawful arrest under Article 269. (Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020) Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer, who has the authority to arrest and detain a person. Thus, a police officer, judge or mayor can commit arbitrary detention. On the other hand, illegal detention such as unlawful arrets is committed by private individual. Stenographer, who has no authority to arrest or detain a person, cannot be held liable for arbitrary detention. A barangay kagawad and barangay tanod are public officers; but they have no authority to arrest. If they lawfully arrested a criminal suspect, this is citizen arrest. If they arrested a person without lawful cause, this is unlawful arrest. Arbitrary detention is not committed since arresting criminals are not part of their functions (Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020) Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer in pursuit of his duty to arrest. The element of “in pursuit of his duty to arrest” in arbitrary detention is present if the purpose of the arrest is: (1) To deliver the suspect to judicial authority (U.S. v. Gellada, G.R. No. L-5151, January 31, 1910); (2) To conduct criminal investigation (U.S. v. Agravante, G.R. No. 3947, January 28, 1908); or (3) To determine if the victim committed a crime. (U.S. v. Hawchaw, G.R. No. L-6909, February 20, 1912) A police officers, who detained a suspected drug trafficker and demanded ransom payment, committed the criminal act in their private capacity. (People v. Gonzalez, Jr., G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016) Detaining any private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be construed as within their official functions of police officers. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for any criminal act. (People vs. Popionco, G.R. No. 200512, June 07, 2017) Hence, they are liable for kidnapping for ransom and not arbitrary detention. Even the subsequent prosecution of the kidnapped victim for sale of dangerous drugs does not negate the criminal liability of the accused for the crime the latter committed against the former. (People vs. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 02, 2017) Taking the prisoner to a secluded place for purposes of detaining and maltreating him constitutes kidnapping and serious illegal detention qualified by the circ*mstance of serious physical injuries. Arbitrary detention is not committed since the accused did not commit the act in furtherance of official function or in the pursuit of authority vested in them. In sum, they committed the act in their purely private capacity. (People v. Santiano, G.R. No. 123979, December 3, 1998) A soldier, who abducted a UP student and detained her at military camps, barangay hall and a resort or safehouse, can be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The civil court and not military court has jurisdiction over the case since this crime is not service connected. Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier's official capacity. (Osorio v. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018) 30. When falsification of public, official or commercial document is a necessary means to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas, G.R. No. L-41265, 14 | P a g e
July 27, 1934), estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85667, February 23, 1995) or theft (People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001), offender is liable for a complex crime under Article 48 of RPC. When falsification of public, official or commercial document is not a necessary means to commit other crimes, this is not a complex crime. Thus, when falsification of public, official or commercial document is a merely a means to conceal malversation (People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L-33252-54, January 20, 1978; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047, October 31, 1933), estafa (People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002; People vs. Benito, G.R. No. 36979, November 23, 1932) or theft, the crimes are separate. Complex crime of estafa through falsification of document is committed if the offender needed to falsify the document in order to use the falsified document in obtaining money or property from the complainant. If the offender, who needs to falsify the document to commit estafa, is an accountable officer (tax collector), this is complex crime of malversation through falsification of public document. If the offender, who needs to falsify the document to commit estafa, is a nonaccountable public officer (payroll officer), this is complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. Falsification and estafa, malversation or theft are separate crimes if the offender is in possession of the property or money of the complainant, and thus, he can misappropriate, malverse or steal it without the necessity of falsifying document. In this situation, he merely falsifies the document to conceal estafa, malversation or theft. Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage as an element of falsification of private document precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa, and vice versa. Damage is an element of estafa; damage is also an element of falsification of private document; hence, the common element principle is applicable since damage is a common element of both crimes. Damage is an element of estafa; however, damage is not an element of falsification of public, official or commercial document; hence, the common element principle is not applicable since damage is not a common element of both crimes. Damage is an element of falsification of private document; however, damage is not an element of malversation; hence, the common element principle is not appliable since damage is not a common element of both crimes. In sum, common element doctrine is only applicable if the crimes committed are falsification of private document and estafa. If the common element principle is applicable, the accused is liable for falsification of private document or estafa. When falsification of private document is a necessary means to commit estafa, the crime committed is falsification. When falsification of private document is not a means to commit estafa, the crime committed is estafa. (People vs. Co, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019) If the falsification of a private document (demand letter, letter of guarantee, payroll of private company or billing statement) is committed as a means to commit estafa, the crime committed is falsification only. Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage as an element in falsification of private document precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa. Hence, estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not present. There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document. (Batulanon vs. People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006; U.S. vs Chan Tiao, G.R. No. 12609, October 30, 1917; People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-34516, November 10, 1931; People vs. Co, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019) If a person commits falsification of private document (e.g., unofficial receipt) to conceal estafa, the crime is estafa only. Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage as an element in estafa precludes the re-use thereof 15 | P a g e
to complete the elements of falsification. Hence, estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not present (See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G. 1913). The crime of use of falsified document, the person who used the forged document is different from the one who falsified it. If the one who used the falsified document is the same person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and the use of the same is not a separate crime. Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same person who falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification. (Jayme vs. People, G.R. No. 248827, August 27, 2020) 31. Culpable malversation and technical malversation -Approving a voucher and signing a check without appropriation law will make the approving public officer liable for technical malversation under Article 220 of RPC. However, approving a voucher and signing a check without appropriation law, without funding, and in violation of law prohibiting such payment will make the approving officer liable for the graver crime of culpable malversation under Article 217. Culpable malversation is committed by a public officer, who knowingly allows another or others to make use of or misappropriate public funds or property through abandonment or negligence. (Sarion vs. People, G.R. Nos. 243029-30, March 18, 2021) 32. A and B are husband and wife. B is having a love affair with C. One evening, A returning home sees C jump from the bedroom of their house. In the bedroom, A sees B lying in bed. A gets his bolo and kills B. This is not death under exceptional circ*mstance since A did not surprise his wife in the act of infidelity. (People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 31268, July 31, 1929 A married woman and her paramour videoed themselves while they are having sexual intercourse. After a month, the husband saw the sex video of his wife with her paramour. Out of extreme jealousy, the husband immediately killed his wife. This is not parricide under exceptional circ*mstance since the husband did not surprise his wife in the very act of sexual intercourse with her paramour. However, the commission of parricide is attended by the ordinary mitigating circ*mstance of passion. R.A. No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law, recognizes the distinction between sexual intercourse, and fingering, cunniling*s or sodomy. Under this law, fingering, cunniling*s, or sodomy of a victim through force constitutes sexual assault, and not rape. Fingering, cunniling*s, or sodomy is not also within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse,” which is an element of adultery, concubinage, or seduction. By the same token, fingering, cunniling*s, or sodomy should be interpreted as outside the context of the words “sexual intercourse” as an element of death under exceptional circ*mstance. Killing the wife while in the act if having hom*osexual intercourse with woman is not death under exceptional circ*mstance. 33. There are three requisites to make a killing as infanticide, to wit: (a) The infant must be killed outside the maternal womb. An unborn fetus is not an infant. Hence, killing an unborn fetus regardless of its viability or intrauterine life is not infanticide, but abortion; (b) The infant must be viable. Even though the fetus is born alive, if it is non-viable, it shall not be considered as an infant for purposes of the crime of infanticide. Killing a non-viable fetus outside the womb is still abortion; and (3) The infant must be less than three days old. For medical purposes, a 3-month-old child is an infant. But for purpose of infanticide, an infant is a child less than 3 days old. A child with a life of three (3) days or more 16 | P a g e
is not an infant; hence killing a child, who is not an infant, is not infanticide but parricide or murder. If abortion or unintentional abortion is committed, and the mother also died, the offender is liable for a complex crime of parricide, murder or homicide with intentional or intentional abortion. Intent to abort is an important element of abortion. If the intention is to kill the mother, but the fetus also died, the offender is liable for a complex crime of parricide, murder or homicide with intentional abortion. 34. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray is committed by person or persons identified as responsible for using violence upon a participant of a tumultuous affray, who suffered serious or less serious physical injuries committed by an unidentified person in the course thereof. (Article 252 of RPC) The provision on physical injuries inflicted in tumultuous affray is an evidentiary measure designed to remedy a situation where the participant thereof, who inflicted serious or less serious physical injuries upon the victim, was not identified because of the confusion. Since there is uncertainty on whether the one, who employed violence against the victim, committed serious or less serious physical injuries or merely slight physical injuries, the former will be punished for physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray with a penalty lesser than that for serious or less serious physical injuries. Failure to identify the offender who inflicted less serious physical injury upon the victim is an important element of physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. If the accused is positively identified as a person, who inflict the injuries on the victim, the former is not entitled to the lesser penalty prescribed for physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. In such a case, there is no confusion, which is the essence of tumultuous affray. Hence, the accused is liable for the graver crime of less serious physical injuries (Lacson vs. People, G.R. No. 243805, September 16, 2020) 35. In Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005, fraudulent representation of the seller that the van to be sold is brand new constitutes other deceit under Article 318. On the other hand, in People v. Rubaton, C.A., 65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19, 1969, false representation that accused has a palay by reason of which the victim parted his money in consideration of the palay constitutes estafa under Article 315. Unlike in the Guinhawa case, the transaction in Rubaton case is imaginary. (Marcos vs. People, G.R. No. 252839, November 10, 2021) 36. If the finder surrenders lost property to a policeman, the latter shall acquire the position occupied by the former. In sum, as far as the law is concerned, the policeman shall be considered the finder of the lost property. If the policeman fails to deliver the lost property to the owner, he is liable for theft. Appropriating the property by the policeman is of the same character as that made by one who originally found the same. (Pante vs. People, G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021) 37. If the accused received the property with the consent of the owner but he merely acquired physical possession in doing so (by reason of contract of employment, boundary arrangement, or contract to repaint a car, obligation to immediately return the property such bringing the gold to the goldsmith), misappropriation shall be considered as taking without consent; hence, the crime committed is theft (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921) or qualified theft (Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000), carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004).
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If the accused received the property with the consent of the owner and he acquired legal possession in doing so by virtue of trust, commission, administration or obligation involving the duty to make delivery or return (e.g., lease, deposit, commodatum, or quasi-contract, or partnership), misappropriation shall be considered as estafa through conversion or misappropriation (Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000). If the accused received the property with the consent of the owner and he acquired ownership in doing so by virtue of a contract (e.g., sale, mutuum or loan), failure to perform obligation under such contract is neither theft nor estafa since the same is purely civil in character (People vs. Montemayor, G.R. No. L17449, August 30, 1962) As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller, collector, cash custodian or branch manager is only physical. Hence, misappropriation of property is qualified theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is accessible to the employee (Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; People vs. Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012; People vs. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020; Manjares vs. People, G.R. No. 207249. May 14, 2021, Justice Caquioa). However, if the employee is an officer of the company with discretion on how to use property or fund of the company to further its interest, his possession is juridical; hence, misappropriation thereof is estafa. Thus, the following officers are liable for estafa for misappropriating company property: a. A bank president who held the money in trust or administration for the bank in his fiduciary capacity with discretion on how to administer such fund (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014); b. A corporate treasurer who received the money for safe-keeping and administration (U.S. vs. Sevilla, G.R. No. 18056, March 16, 1922; c. A corporate officer with discretion option on how to use bending machine without the participation of the corporation (D’Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012). However, in Remo vs. Devanadera, G.R. No. 192925, December 9, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the directors of a corporation have no juridical possession over the corporate funds. If the crime charged is estafa through misappropriation, but the crime proven is theft committed by an employee, whose possession over the property is merely physical, the variance principle can be applied. Thus, the accused can be convicted of a qualified theft because the latter crime was necessarily included in the crime of estafa charged in the information. (Reside vs. People, G.R. No. 210318, July 28, 2020) Misappropriation by the industrial partner of the share of the capitalist partner (People vs. Clemente, CA, 65 OG 6892) or the partnership fund to be used in buying and selling mango (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 21732, September 3, 1924) is estafa. Theft is not committed (US vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 2867, September 11, 1906) Misappropriation by the industrial partner of the partnership fund to be used in business of buying and selling mango is not theft because possession of the industrial partner over the same is juridical. The concept of juridical possession is not compatible with that of “taking without consent,” which is the essence of theft (People vs. Tan Tay Cuan, CA, 57 OG 6964). However, the industrial partner is liable for estafa through misappropriation. The industrial partner is holding the money in trust of the partnership. (Orbe vs. Miaral, G.R. No. 217777, August 16, 2017) 38. In order for any group to be considered a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689, the perpetrators of an estafa must not only be comprised of at least five individuals but must have also used the association that they formed or managed to defraud its own stockholders, members or depositors. (Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018) There are three parties involved in syndicated estafa, to wit: (1) the corporation or association; (2) general public such as stockholders and members 18 | P a g e
of the association; they are the victims and (3) the owners and members of the association, who used such association to defraud the general public; they are the offenders, who must be at least five. The association or corporation (first party) can neither be a victim nor the offender in syndicated estafa. The association is just an instrument used by the offenders to defraud the victim. A bank cannot charge its employees with syndicated estafa for misappropriating its money. (Galvez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013) The crime committed by a bank employee or officer is estafa or theft depending upon the nature of their position. Globe Asiatique (GA) defrauded Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) by requiring fictitious buyers to obtain loans from Pag-ibig fund. To be held liable for syndicated estafa, officers of GA must use GA to defraud its stockholders or members. HMDF cannot be a victim of syndicated estafa since it is not a stockholder or a member of GA. To be held liable for syndicated estafa, GA must solicit funds from the general public or its stockholders or members. In this case, it is HMDF and not GA, which is soliciting funds from general public or Pag-ibig members. (Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018) Atty. Alvarez, who is an employee of HDMF and who rendered notarial services to GM, cannot be a member of syndicate in the crime of syndicated estafa. He is not an owner or member of GA. (Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sagun, supra) 39. If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder only. Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs arson since the latter is an inherent means to commit the former (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994). Single act of burning the building to kill two persons constitutes compound crime of double murders (People vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008) To apply this principle, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010). If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is arson with qualifying circ*mstance of resulting death (People v. Abayon, G.R. No. 204891, September 2016). The resulting homicide is absorbed (People vs. Villacorta, G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008) since it will be considered as a modificatory circ*mstance. To apply this principle, there must be no intent to kill, and the killing of the victim is accidental. If the main objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994). Pedro treacherously killed 2 victims, and burned the house to conceal the killings. He is not aware that there is a baby in the house. As a consequence of the burning of the house, the baby died. Pedro committed 2 murders. Arson committed to conceal the crime is a separate crime. The death of the baby shall be considered as a qualifying circ*mstance. The resulting homicide is absorbed in arson since it will be considered as a modificatory circ*mstance. Pedro treacherously killed 2 victims, and burned the house to conceal the killings despite of the fact that he is aware that there is a baby in the house. Pedro committed 2 murders qualified by the circ*mstance of treachery and another murder qualified by the circ*mstance of by means of fire. The intention of Pedro in burning the house is to conceal the two murders and to kill the victim. 19 | P a g e
There is intent to kill since he knows that the baby will die as a consequence of burning the house. Hence, the burning of the house is not arson, but murder. 40. Under Article 349, bigamy is committed by any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved. The term "former marriage" in Article 349 refers to a valid marriage, and not a null and void marriage. The term "second or subsequent marriage" in Article 349 refers to a marriage which is valid in all aspect other than circ*mstance that is void for being bigamous. Thus, voidness of the first or second marriage is a defense in bigamy. (Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021) Antonio was married legally to Josefa, and during the existence of this marriage Antonio married Petra on January 1, 1950. On July 1, 1952, the first wife died, and three months later on Oct. 1, 1952. Antonio married Catalina. Antonio committed bigamy for contracting second marriage despite the first marriage is subsisting. However, Antonio is not liable for bigamy for contracting the third marriage because the first marriage has already been extinguished by the death of the first wife, Josefa, when he contracted the third, and the second marriage with Petra is void for being a bigamous marriage. Applying the Pulido principle, Antonio need not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage for being bigamous before entering into a third marriage for purpose of raising the voidness of the former as a defense in bigamy. CBP is legally married to OEM. Without obtaining a marriage license, CBP contracted a second marriage to RST. What is the crime committed by CBP? Reason briefly. CBP committed the crime of illegal marriage. Illegal marriage is committed by any person who shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with provided that the act is not constitutive of bigamy. In this case, CBP married RST without complying with the requirement on marriage license. The act of contracting a second marriage is not constitutive of bigamy since the second marriage contracted without marriage license is null and void. Applying the Pulido principle, there is no technically a second marriage for being null and void, and hence, contracting a void second marriage is not bigamy. 41. In 2012, Rica published a story in an online news site, called Raffa, where it was alleged that Mr. Willy, a businessman, who had a link with illegal drugs, and human trafficking, lent a car to a former SC Chief Justice. After four months, RA No. 10175, which punishes cybercrimes including cyber libel, was enacted. However, there are no evidences proving the illegal activities of Mr. Willy. In 2014, the story was republished in the said site. It is settled that a single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives rise to as many offenses as there are publications. Each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. This is the “multiple publication rule” which is followed in our jurisdiction. (Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72383, November 9, 1988; Brillante v. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757 and 121571, October 19, 2004) With the multiple publication rule, Rica can be charged of libel for the 2012 publication of defamatory story, and cyber libel for the 2014 republication thereof without violating the rule on double jeopardy. The penalty for libel under the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. If communication or information technology is used in committing libel, RA No. 10175 provides that the penalty for libel shall be graduated one degree higher. In sum, the penalty for cyber libel is prison correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. The period for prescription for cyber libel is governed by Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Act No. 3326 governs prescription of offense punishable under special law. However, cyber libel is not punishable under special law. RA 20 | P a g e
No. 10175 does not provide a penalty for cyber libel. Hence, in a cyber libel case, the accused is actually being charged with libel under the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circ*mstance of using information or communication technology under RA No. 10175. Since the crime is punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the provision of the Code on prescription and not Act 3326 will apply. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of libel shall prescribe in one year while crime punishable by prision mayor shall prescribe in 15 years. However, the one-year rule is only applicable to libel and not to cyber libel. Hence, the 15-year rule will apply since the highest component of the penalty for cyber libel is prision mayor in its minimum period. (Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310, August 6, 2018) When the accused has been specifically identified as "author, editor, or proprietor" or "printer/publisher" of the publication, there is no requirement to prove that they had knowledge and participation in the publication of the libelous article. Thus, a claim of absence of participation by those persons responsible under Article 360 will not shield them from liability. The law is clear: These persons are liable for libel as if they were the author of the defamatory writing. (Macasaet vs. So, G.R. No. 187230, January 11, 2021; People vs. Santos and Ressa, CA-G.R. No. 44991, July 7, 2022) 41. Under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, child abuse pertains to acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development not covered by the Revised Penal Code. From the plain language of Section 10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished under the RPC are mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC (e.g., oral defamation or physical injuries) are excluded from the coverage of Section 10(a). Brinas vs. People, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, Justice Caquioa) The intention of the law in using the phrase “not covered by the Revised Penal Code” is to prosecute the offender either for the crime under RA No. 7610 or felony under RPC and not for both crimes. In sum, if the offender threatened to kill a child or inflicted injuries on him on the spur of the moment without intent to degrade, debase or demean him, the former should be charged with grave threat or physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code without correlating it with RA No. 7610. On the other hand, if the offender threatened to kill a child or inflicted injuries on him with intent to degrade, debase or demean him, the former should be charged with child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610 without correlating it with the Revised Penal Code. In Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, accused saw the victim and his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to degrade the dignity of the victim. Without such intent, the crime committed is not child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 but merely slight physical injuries. In Escolano vs. People, G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018, complainants, who are minors, threw ketchup sachets against the daughter of the accused. But it was the accused, who was hit by the sachets twice. Accused exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko." Threatening to release her dog to chase and bite the minors made in the heat of anger is not child abuse. Accused merely intended that they stop their rude behavior. Absence of any intention to degrade the dignity of minors, accused is only liable for other light threats. 21 | P a g e
In Brinas vs. People, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, accused, a directress of Montessori school, uttered "pinakamalalandi, pinakamalilibog, pinakamahadera at hindot, Mga putang ina kayo” against two minor students. Accused’ acts were only done in the heat of anger, made after she had just learned that the complainants had deceivingly used her daughter's name to send a text message to another student, in what accused thought was part of a bigger and harmful scheme against the student body. The accused was acquitted of child abuse for failure to prove intent to degrade the complainants. In Bongalon case, the accused were convicted of slight physical injuries instead of child abuse. In Escolano case, accused was convicted of other light threats instead of child abuse. In Brinas case, the accused were not held liable for child abuse or any other crime. The Bongalon principle is inapplicable: (1) if the accused did not assault a child in the heat of anger or as a spontaneous reaction to his misbehavior; or (2) if the child suffered serious physical injuries lacerations, fractured bones, burns, or internal injuries. In Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019, throwing boiling cooking oil, which directed against the mother of a baby and 3-year-old child, which consequently burned the faces and skin of the minors, is not constitutive of child abuse involving degrading the dignity of a child. Since throwing boiling oil is not directed against the children, intent to degrade, debase or demean their dignity is not established. However, the accused is still liable of child abuse involving the infliction of serious physical injury. Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610 punishes child abuse. There are several crimes of child abuse under Section 3 (b) thereof, the two of which are psychological and physical abuse and any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Child abuse involving debasing, demeaning or degrading a child under Section 3 (b) (2) is different from child abuse involving psychological and physical abuse under Section 3 (b) (1). Under the implementing rules, “physical injury” includes lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by a child. In the case of Patulot, the information does not allege that the accused debased, demeaned or degraded the complainants as children. The crimes alleged in the two informations are child abuses involving burning under Section 3 (b) (1). Hence, even without intent to degrade, debase or demean a child, the accused was convicted of two counts of child abuse. Article 233 of the Family Code prohibits the infliction of corporal punishment by teachers. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her minor student, who even fainted, is liable for child abuse under RA No. 7610. (Rosaldes v. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014) 42. Consent is immaterial in cases involving sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 16 years of age. However, consent is material when the offended party is a child, who is 16 years old or above. In such a case, consent of the child is a defense in cases involving sexual abuse. If the prosecution proved that the accused have sexual intercourse with child through coercion or influence, the sex is non-consensual. Hence, the accused is liable for sexual abuse. If the prosecution failed to prove coercion or influence, the sex is consensual. Hence, the accused is not liable for sexual abuse. In Bangayan vs. People, G.R. No. 235610, September 16, 2020, there are special circ*mstances that reveal the presence consent of AAA. The sexual congress between accused and AAA was not limited to just one incident. They were in a relationship even after the incident alleged in the Information and had even produced two (2) children. It is clear that AAA, who is capable to discern good from evil, give 22 | P a g e
consent to the sexual act. Accused was acquitted. Note: Prosecution failed to prove coercion or influence. 43. If the acts constitute sexual abuse, and rape, sexual assault, or acts of lasciviousness, the accused can neither be prosecuted for both crimes because of the rule on double jeopardy nor for complex crime since sexual abuse is punishable under special law. Components of complex crime must be felonies (People vs. Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009) If the child is 16 years old or more, and the act of the offender constitutes rape and sexual abuse, he shall be prosecuted for graver crime of rape under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecuting the accused for the lesser crime of sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 is unfair to the child and will ago against the spirit of RA No. 7610 to protect children by prescribing a higher penalty. (People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019) If the child is 16 years old or more, and the act of the offender constitutes sexual assault or acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse, the accused shall be prosecuted for graver crime of sexual abuse under RA No. 7610. In this situation, sexual abuse shall be called lascivious conduct. Prosecuting the accused for the lesser crime of sexual assault or acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code is unfair to the child and will ago against the spirit of RA No. 7610 to protect children by prescribing a higher penalty. (People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019) If the child is under 16 years old, and the act of the offender constitutes rape and sexual abuse, the accused shall be prosecuted for graver crime of statutory rape under the Revised Penal Code. Under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 as amended by RA No. 11648, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape. If the child is under 16 years old, and the act of the offender constitutes acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse, the accused shall be prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA No. 7610. Under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape or lascivious conduct, Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Acts of lasciviousness is within the contemplation of the words “lascivious conduct” in RA No. 7610. (People vs. ZZZ, G.R. No. 232500, July 28, 2020) If the child is under 16 years old, and the act of the offender constitutes simple sexual assault and sexual abuse, the accused shall be prosecuted for sexual assault under the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA No. 7610. Under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape or lascivious conduct, Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Since reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610 is higher than the penalty (of prision mayor) for sexual assault under the Revised Penal Code, it is only fair for the child to impose the graver penalty under RA No. 7610. (People vs. ZZZ, G.R. No. 232500, July 28, 2020) In sum, sexual assault is within the contemplation of the words “lascivious conduct” in Section 5 of RA No. 8710. (People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011; People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 230981, July 15, 2020) If the victim is under 16 years old, and the act of the offender constitutes qualified sexual assault and sexual abuse, the accused shall be prosecuted for qualified sexual assault and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape or lascivious conduct, Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct shall be reclusion 23 | P a g e
temporal in its medium period. Since the Revised Penal Code prescribes a grave penalty of reclusion temporal for qualified sexual assault, there is no need to apply the penalty under RA No. 7610. In sum, qualified sexual assault is within the contemplation of the word “rape” in Section 5 of RA No. 8710. (People v. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011) 44. The person, who knowingly leases or subleases, uses or allows to be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons is liable for promoting trafficking in person (Section 5 of RA No. 9208). The pimp is liable for trafficking in person (Section 4). The customer of the trafficked prostitute is liable for use of trafficked victim (Section 11). The trafficked prostitute is exempt from criminal liability for the crime of prostitution (Sections 17 and 32) In People vs. Sayo, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, Justice Caquioa, the accused owned a house where its room was offered for lease for every paying customer of the complainants, who engaged in sex for a fee. Accused is aware of these prostitution activities since he cleaned the room after the complainant and her customer finished using it. Moreover, he sold condoms to complainant's male customers before using the room. The trial court trial court convicted him of qualified trafficking in person for knowingly leasing his house for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons under Section 5 of RA No. 9208. The Supreme Court said that the trial court committed a serious error. The crime under Section 5 of RA 9208 must be properly denominated as “acts that promote trafficking in persons,” and not qualified trafficking in person. 45. XXX and YYY maintained their three biological children (minors) to perform acts of cybersex on p*rnographic websites for different foreign customers in exchange for money or ordering them to dance naked in front of a computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a particular customer. They are liable for three counts of qualified trafficking in persons. XXX and YYY achieved their criminal design in requiring their children to perform acts of cybersex for different foreign customers by taking advantage of their children’s vulnerability as minors and deceiving them that the money they make from their lewd shows is needed for the family’s daily sustenance. The circ*mstances that the victims are minors and the traffickers are ascendants of the victims qualify the crime. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018) XXX induced his 14-year-old girlfriend to send him pictures of her vagin* and breasts through Facebook Messenger using a mobile phone. He was convicted of cyber child p*rnography for persuading or inducing a child through a computer system to perform in the creation or production of any form of child p*rnography. (Cadajas v. People, G.R. No. 247348, June 15, 2022) XXX induced his 14-year-old girlfriend to dance nude during his birthday party. The crime committed is indecent shows under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes a person who shall persuade or induce a child to perform in indecent shows, whether live or in video. Note: RA No. 11930 is not violated since the crime is not committed through online. XXX and YYY maintained three poor adult women to perform acts of cybersex on p*rnographic websites for different foreign customers in exchange for money or ordering them to dance naked in front of a computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a particular customer. They are liable for trafficking in persons. R.A. No. 9208 punishes a person who shall maintain a person for p*rnography by taking advantage of their vulnerability due to poverty. XXX asked an adult woman to send him pictures of her vagin* and breasts through Facebook Messenger using a mobile phone in consideration of 24 | P a g e
P500,000.00. The woman agreed. This is not trafficking in person because XXX is not hiring, maintaining, etc. the woman to engage in p*rnography. Child p*rnography or indecent show under R.A. No. 7610 is not committed since the woman is not a child. XXX and the woman are liable for cybersex since the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs was committed with the aid of a computer system for consideration. Cybersex under R.A. No. 10175 includes cyber p*rnography for favor and consideration. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014) XXX induced his 19-year-old girlfriend to send him pictures of her vagin* and breasts through Facebook Messenger using a mobile phone. XXX is not criminally liable. Cyber child p*rnography is not committed since his girlfriend is not a child. Cybersex is not committed since there is no consideration involved. Maria, a lawyer, for consideration of P5,000.00, danced and undressed herself in front of Em while the music “making love out of nothing at all” was being played. This is not trafficking in person because Em is not hiring, maintaining, etc. Maria to engage in p*rnography, and there is no taking advantage of her vulnerability. A lawyer is not vulnerable to being exploited in p*rnography. Child p*rnography or indecent show under R.A. No. 7610 is not committed since Maria is not a child. Cybersex is not committed since the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs was not made with the aid of a computer system. The crime committed is indecent show under the Revised Penal Code, which punishes those who shall exhibit indecent shows in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other place, whether live or in film. 46. To establish the first link in the chain of custody, and that is the seizure of the drug from the accused, the prosecution must comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640. Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended, the inventory and photography of the seized items must be made in the presence of “at least three persons”, to wit: (1) the accused; (2) elected public official, and (3) the media or representatives of National Prosecution Service. Compliance with the three-witnesses rule is mandatory. So as not to render the seizures of evidence void, two requisites must be present: (1) justifiable ground for not complying with the three-witnesses rule and (2) that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence had been preserved. (People vs. Claudel, G.R. No. 219852, April 3, 2019, Justice Caguioa) Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by RA No. 10640, the inventory and photography of the seized items must be made in the presence of “at least three persons”, to wit: (1) the accused or the person from whom such items were confiscated or his representative or counsel; (2) any elected public official, and (3) the media or representatives of National Prosecution Service. RA No. 9165 as amended uses the disjunctive “or” in the phrase “the National Prosecution elected public official Service or the media.” Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other (People vs. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018; People vs. Baluyot, G.R. No. 243390, October 05, 2020) The following are justifiable grounds for failure to comply with the threewitnesses rule: 1. The attendance of elective official and media or NPS representative was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; 2. The safety of these required witnesses during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person acting for and in his behalf; 3. The elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; 4. The time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape; or 5. Earnest efforts to secure the presence of these required witnesses within the period required under Article 125 of RPC prove futile through no fault of the 25 | P a g e
arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention. (People vs. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018) Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime involving dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. However, this provision was declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court (Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017). Following this pronouncement, the Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a plea-bargaining framework in drugs cases, while the Secretary of Justice issued DOJ Circular No. 27 on plea bargaining. The Supreme Court guidelines on acceptable plea bargaining are different from those provided by the DOJ. On July 26, 2022 the Supreme Court came out with a Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in Drugs Cases under which the Dangerous Drugs Courts can overrule the objection of the public prosecutor to accused’s motion to plea to a lesser offense and allow plea-bargaining even without the consent to the prosecutor. The court is required to reject the objection of the prosecutor based on the circ*mstance that the proposed plea is not in accordance with the DOJ guidelines. In sum, what is important is the SC guidelines. 47. A violation of a law (e.g., a law on public bidding) that is not penal in nature does not, as it cannot, automatically translate into a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. (Concurring opinion of Justice Caguioa, Villarosa vs. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020) Violations of the applicable procurement laws (that generally required public bidding) do not mean that the elements of the crime under Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 are already present as a matter of course. For there to be a violation under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 based on a breach of applicable procurement laws, one cannot solely rely on the mere fact that a violation of procurement laws has been committed. It must be shown that (1) the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference; and (2) the accused acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence. (Martel vs. People, G.R. No. 224720-23, February 2, 2021, Justice Caquioa) such as awarding contract without public bidding to a relative (Cabrera v. People, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019; People v. Austria, G.R. 243897, June 08, 2020) or involving overpriced fire extinguishers and the supplies. (Oani v. People, G.R. No. 139984, March 31, 2005)
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 81563 and 82512, December 19, 1989, the property bought by the City is overpriced. When the accused was appointed as treasurer, the sale of the property had already been consummated. Accused was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for causing damage to the government through manifest partiality and evident bad faith. The only evidence presented by the prosecution is his signature on the voucher. He was acquitted. Heads of offices can rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates on preparation of bids, purchase of supplies, or negotiations. Any executive head agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. Thus, executive head cannot be convicted on the sole basis of signature or approval appearing on a voucher. To sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction, evidence must be presented other than her signature on the voucher. The principle in the Arias case is not applicable in the following cases: a. If other than the accused’s signature on the voucher, circ*mstances show evident bad faith, or manifest partiality such as: (a) Where the accused has foreknowledge of existing anomaly – e.g., mayor signed the inspection report and the disbursem*nt voucher despite the fact that he had foreknowledge that the materials delivered by Guadines have already been confiscated by the DENR (Escara v. People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005); or (b) where accused approved the voucher without indication of the retention money required by law, and he 26 | P a g e
even inspected the construction site of hospital boat being constructed, in which he should have noticed the financial weakness of the contractor and the defective works (Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014); b. If other than the accused’s signature on the voucher, circ*mstances show gross inexcusable negligence such as where there is deviation from ordinary procedure, which necessitate further investigation – e.g., mayor issued and encashed municipal checks despite the facts that the disbursem*nt vouchers were in the name of Kelly Lumber but the checks were payable to another person and not to Kelly Lumber (Cruz v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005) or if there were circ*mstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries on the transactions subject of this case. (Abubakar vs. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018) c. If the public officer acting in his capacity as head of office has not relied on his subordinates but on officers of equal rank such as heads of the Office of the City Treasurer and, the Office of the City Accountant in approving the cash advances in the amount of P18 million to paymaster despite of the failure to liquidate previous cash advances (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013); and d. If the documents involving the release of funds are not so voluminous so as to preclude him from studying each one carefully. (Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos. 175045–46, March 3, 2010) 42. If there are several accused in plunder case, who acted under a single conspiracy, or wheel conspiracy, or chain conspiracy, the main plunderer must be identified. The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least P50 million. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators. (See: Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017) In Arroyo vs. People, supra, a case for plunder involving the misappropriation of PCSO funds amounting to P360 million was filed against ten (10) accused including President Arroyo. However, the information did not identify President Arroyo or any other accused as the principal plunderer. Hence, the case was dismissed. It was held that because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. The individuals charged therein were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00. Plunder can be committed by the public officer acting alone (Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006, Concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban) Plunder can be committed by the public officer in connivance with other persons. If the public officer committed plunder in connivance with other persons, the “other persons” or the participants (secondary offenders) are also liable on the basis of conspiracy. Moreover, the participants, with whom the public officer connived in committing plunder, are liable under R.A. No. 7080. Under Section 2 of this law, any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In single conspiracy, the public officer conspired with a single individual or group in committing plunder. The main plunderer in this case must be a 27 | P a g e
public officer. But the participants in this case can be public officers or private individuals. In Juan Ponce Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, in the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million. Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). (Fernan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007) In wheel conspiracy involving plunder, the public officer (main plunderer or the hub) amasses, accumulates and acquires ill-gotten wealth in connivance with others (the spokes). The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. 48. Section 12 of RA No. 11053 provides that the defense that the recruit, neophyte, or applicant consented to being subjected to hazing shall not be available to persons prosecuted for hazing. Any form of approval, consent, or agreement, whether written or otherwise, or of an express waiver of the right to object to the initiation rite or proceeding, which consists of hazing, made by a recruit, neophyte, or applicant prior to an initiation rite that involves inflicting physical or psychological suffering, harm, or injury, shall be void and without any binding effect on the parties. Generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. (Dungo v. People, supra) However, under RA No. 8049 as amended by RA No. 11053, mere presence can be a source of criminal liability. Section 14 punishes all persons who are present in the conduct of the hazing. However, the penalty is higher if the persons, who are present during the hazing, are (1) officers of the fraternity, sorority, or organization; (2) former officers, nonresident members, or alumni thereof; and (3) members thereof who are intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs. The law punishes all persons, who actually planned the conduct of the hazing. The original version of RA No. 8049 merely punished officers, former officers, or alumni of the fraternity, sorority or organization, who actually planned the hazing. Under this law as amended by RA No. 11053, any person including a non-member is criminally liable for planning the conduct of hazing. Even though these planners were not present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals. The law also punishes the adviser of a fraternity, sorority, or organization who is present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the law enforcement authorities if such adviser or advisers can do so without peril to their person or their family. The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but also his failure to prevent the same. (Dungo v. People, supra) The owner or lessee of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as principal, when such owner or lessee has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to their person or their family. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the law enforcement authorities if such parents can do so without peril to their person or their family. 28 | P a g e
The school authorities including faculty members as well as barangay, municipal, or city officials shall be liable as an accomplice and likewise be held administratively accountable for hazing conducted by the fraternities, sororities, other organizations, if it can be shown that the school or barangay, municipal, or city officials allowed or consented to the conduct of hazing, but such officials failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report to the law enforcement authorities if the same can be done without peril to their person or their family. 49. Physical violence against woman is punishable under Section 5 (a). However, if physical violence caused mental or emotional anguish to the victim, the offender may be prosecuted for psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i). Physical violence will be considered as an element of psychological violence. In Dinamling v. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015, accused’s acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping the victim of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in her public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. Accused was convicted of the psychological violence against woman. Physical violence was treated as a mere element of the graver crime of psychological violence against woman. Deprivation of legal support under the Family Code by a man to his wife or children may constitute economic violence against a woman under Section 5 (e) of RA No. 9262 or psychological violence against a woman under Section 5 (i). However, deprivation of financial support per se does not violate RA No. 9262 unless it is accompanied by the other elements of economic violence or psychological violence. The crimes penalized under Section 5 (i) and 5 (e) of RA No. 9262 are mala in se, and not mala prohibita, even though R.A. No. 9262 is a special law. The acts punished therein are inherently wrong and the language used under the said special laws requires a mental element. Being a crime mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of both actus reus (criminal act) and mens rea (criminal intent) to constitute a crime. (Acharon vs. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021, Justice Caquioa) The willful deprivation of financial support is the actus reus of economic violence under Section 5 (e), while the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman’s conduct. To violate Section 5 (e), there must be allegation and proof that the act was done with intent to control or restrict the woman’s and/or child’s or her children’s actions or decision. The actus reus of psychological violence under Section 5 (i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. To violate Section 5 (i), there must be allegation and proof that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by him to accomplish the said purpose. In Acharon vs. People, supra (Justice Caquioa), the Supreme Court finds the accused not guilty of psychological violence under Section 5 (i) for he tried, as he successfully did for a time, to provide financial support to his wife. The accused failed to provide financial support only when his apartment in Brunei was razed by fire, and when he met a vehicular accident there. Moreover, he had already paid P71,000 of the P85,000 of the debt the spouses were obligated to pay out of their community property. The Court also found the accused not guilty of economic violence under Section 5 (e). There is no proof that he deliberately refused to give support in order to control the behavior or actions of his wife. 29 | P a g e
Neither was there any allegation or proof that he prevented his wife from seeking gainful employment or pursuing economic opportunities. Concubinage and bigamy are punishable under the Revised Penal Code. However, if concubinage or bigamy caused mental or emotional anguish to the offended wife, the offending husband may be prosecuted for psychological violence against a woman. (Araza vs. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 20200
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